Insured farm loans have evolved to be an public program is creating indirect costs to important component of the federal role in the regular agricultural borrowers. agricultural credit subsector. Currently, agri-
The Georgia Development Authority (GDA) cultural credit is supplied by three sets of instiprovides a unique opportunity to explore tutions: (1) private firms and individuals, (2) empirically the policy issues related to publicly the quasiprivate cooperative Farm Credit Sysinsured farm loan programs. The GDA was tem, and (3) the federal public programs of the created by the State of Georgia in 1954 as a Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) and public nonprofit corporation. Its original capitSmall Business Administration. Statuatory alization was provided by the assets of the authority currently limits federal programs to Georgia Rural Rehabilitation Corporation. The a residual role of lending to borrowers who function of the GDA is to insure and service cannot receive credit from the other segments.
long-term loans secured by farm real estate for Though a large component of public programs commercial banks and other credit instituconsists of emergency loans in areas of tions. Total insured loans are limited to 15 pereconomic disaster, the FmHA also makes farm cent of the GDA's capitalized assets, and operating and real estate loans to farmers who public appropriations or money market instrumeet the statuatory requirements. The source ments cannot be a source of operating or loan of funds for some FmHA loans is federal apfunds. Unlike the Farmers Home Administrapropriations and money market certificates.
tion, the GDA makes its program available to However, guaranteed loans have become an all owners of farm real estate. 2 The GDA enimportant component of FmHA programs. ables us to analyze the impact of insured loans These loans are made in cooperation with other on the aggregate supply of farm credit without agricultural finance agencies. The public considering the limited eligibility for loans agency insures or guarantees repayment of the associated with federal programs. loan. The cooperating firm negotiates the loan
The purpose of our article is to present some and provides the funds. Usually the interest empirical research on the impact of insured payment is below the current market interest credit on the aggregate supply of agricultural rate structure.' credit. Specifically, the alternative hypotheses An important issue concerning the guaranconcerning redistribution of or increase in the teed loan program is whether it effectively insupply of agricultural credit by agricultural creases the aggregate supply of agricultural banks are tested with reference to the GDA credit or only redistributes loanable funds program. A cross-sectional econometric model from regular farm borrowers to marginal farm of agricultural credit supply by banks in Georborrowers. Redistribution of loanable funds gia is developed and estimated. This model can be justified by public objectives related to provides evidence on the policy hypotheses as income redistribution and facilitation of entry well as other hypotheses pertaining to agriculinto farming. Our investigation does not purtural credit. sue the desirability of these objectives; instead it focuses on the extent to which the insured CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK loan program increases agricultural credit. Increasing the aggregate supply would Recently, Robison and Barry conceptualized contribute to these objectives without transthe portfolio decision of a bank in an expected ferring capital away from farmers who can obutility framework. The research reported was supported in part by a grant from the Georgia Development Authority, Atlanta, Georgia. Terry Roe made some helpful suggestions on the theory used and three anonymous reviewers made helpful comments on a draft of the article.
'For a more thorough description of the U.S. agricultural credit system, see Barry, Hopkins, and Baker, Chapter 2. 'Carlan and Wise have more completely described the GDA program.
of the expected value and variance of returns proposition of Adam Smith (p. 3) . The (Markowitz; Sharpe) . In this model, the bank is existence of economies of size in banking has assumed to maximize the following formulabeen well documented empirically; Mullineaux tion of expected utility (EU).
discusses the issue and also reviews the pertinent literature. Thus, specialized information (1) EU = CjXj -a E Xjxk o2 [ can serve as the basis for the assumption that 2) J k GDA insured loans have lower risk than where xj = investment in asset j, cj = expected similar uninsured loans by banks. 3 return on assets, a = the risk aversion coefficIn examining the substitution of GDA loans ient for the bank, and oj2 = variance of return for assets with similar risks, such as governon asset j if j = k and covariance between rement securities, one must consider the indirect turns on assets j and k is j # k. This framework effects of such action in addition to direct risk is consistent with both hypotheses concerning and returns of the two classes of assets. Recipthe impact of insured loans on the supply of ients of the GDA loans are more likely to retain agricultural credit. A simple rationalization the proceeds in the local area. As Barry has would be that a bank would substitute GDA noted, such deposits can serve as the basis for loans for other assets if the expected value and increased bank investments. GDA loans can variance of returns on GDA loans were consistherefore indirectly affect returns through the tent with the maximization of its utility funcborrower's increased level of deposits prior to tion. Covariance of returns from insured loans spending the loan proceeds, from growth with returns from other assets may also proarising from the financing, and from accumulavide a reason for substitution for other assets.
tion of funds to repay the loan. The loan and its The more risk averse the bank, i.e., the larger direct stimulation of deposits may also have its value of a, the more likely the occurrence of further indirect effects. by increasing the level such substitution. The redistribution hypotheof business activity in the community. sis would suggest the substitution of insured Portfolio theory is helpful in providing some loans for regular farm loans whereas the inhypotheses concerning the willingness of creased supply hypothesis would indicate subbanks to hold insured loans, but it does not stitution for nonfarm assets.
provide a specific empirical model for testing This reasoning abstracts from an important the hypotheses of interest to us. If the objectheoretical issue concerning insured loans-the tive in equation 1 is maximized subject to proinsurer's ability to bear the risk of the loan is duction constraints, asset supply functions can superior to that of the cooperating firm. Fedbe derived from the first-order conditions as in eral insured loan programs derive this superthe static theory of the firm. These functions iority from the spreading of risk over the whole would be reduced-form equations in that asset nation and the potential use of public subsidemand would be a function of exogenous varidies. However, GDA operates only in Georgia ables. However, the hypothesis of interest to and has no access to public appropriations. us concerns the relationships between levels of Though GDA undoubtedly has more risk-GDA loans and other assets. Thus, economic spreading ability than a commercial bank theory could be used in an indirect manner to serving a local area, its superior access to insuggest variables to include in a simultaneous formation on farm real estate loans is an econometric model for various assets. important component of its comparative ad-
The specific model consists of three equavantage in risk bearing. Akerloff and Lipton tions with three endogenous variables-total both argue that differential access to informaloans for an individual bank (TLOAN), total tion can affect agricultural credit institutions, loans secured by agricultural assets for an The operation of GDA requires specialized individual bank (FLOAN), and total GDA inknowledge about agriculture and security sured loans for an individual bank (GLOAN). values of farm real estate which must be conNote that FLOAN is a component of TLOAN, stantly revised in the dynamic environment of and GLOAN is a component of FLOAN. As modern agriculture. Insurance companies and cross-sectional data are used in the estimation, Federal Land Banks have sufficient volume to each equation can be considered a reduced justify employment of specialized personnel, form of a supply and demand system for the but many small banks and even large banks particular dependent variable in the equation. with a low volume of agricultural loans could
The variables included in this model would also not justify such a division of labor. The appear in the supply and demand equations of superior information of specialized personnel the structural model. relates to the existence of economies of size in
The particular model specification for an finance. The existence of such economies of individual bank is size from specialized personnel is a central (2) TLOAN = f 1 (FLOAN, DEP, URBAN) ' Roe and Nygaard present a theoretical demonstration that improved information can reduce the variance of profits of agricultural producers. A similar formulation could be used to derive rigorously the assumption that increased information would reduce variance for agricultural lenders.
(3) FLOAN = f(TLOAN, GLOAN, SALE, this logic. LOAN/DEP is included as a proxy URBAN) of risk preferences of bank managers or owners and a negative relationship is expected. SALE (4) GLOAN = f 3 (FLOAN, SALE, is included as a measure of the importance of LOAN/DEP) farming in the market areas of the bank. If banks wish to include farm loans in their loan where DEP = total deposits of the bank, portfolio but agriculture is an unimportant URBAN = banks located in urban areas, business activity in their area, GDA loans may SALE = gross farm sales in the bank's trading be attractive. The SALE coefficient is area, and LOAN/DEP = the ratio of total loans therefore expected to be negative. to total deposits for the bank.
In summary, the hypothesis that the GDA Our primary concern is the coefficient on program increases agricultural credit in GLOAN in equation 3. If this coefficient is Georgia is tested. Other hypotheses concerngreater than one, the hypothesis of increased ing economic relationships in rural banking inagricultural credit is supported; if it is less clude: (1) agricultural loans reflect economies than or equal to zero, the alternative hypotheof size in farming, (2) the banking sector sis is supported; an intermediate value sugexhibits economies of size in loans, (3) seasongests some redistribution and some increase in ality associated with agriculture decreases the supply. 4 A positive coefficient on FLOAN is proportion of loans to deposits for farm banks, expected in equation 2 because of likely portand (4) the covariance relationship between folio effects arising from the covariance farm loans and other loans allows total loans to relationships between farm and other loans. If be higher for banks that include farm loans in the returns on FLOAN are less than perfectly their loan portfolio. The results of the econocorrelated with other loans, increasing metric analysis provide some evidence on these FLOAN will reduce the risk of TLOAN and hypotheses. therefore allow substitution of TLOAN for other less risky assets. DEP is expected to be METHODS AND PROCEDURES positively related to TLOAN because it is the major source of loanable funds for banks Data to estimate the econometric model were (Barry); a nonlinear specification of DEP drawn from several sources. Call data from the would be appropriate because of the previously Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta for June 1975 discussed economies of size in banking. The inwere used for TLOAN, DEP, and FLOAN. We clusion of URBAN in equation 2 reflects the recognized that these variables would be empirical fact that farm banks can loan a subject to considerable seasonal variation. The smaller proportion of their deposits because quarter ending in June would be expected to their deposits are more variable throughout reflect the highest seasonal level of FLOAN as the year (Barry, Hopkins, and Baker) . SALE in harvest of major crops is completed in the subequation 3 reflects the demand for farm loans sequent quarter. Consequently, the data in as related to agricultural activity in the bank's June would represent the highest agricultural trading area, and a positive coefficient is loan activity. Data on GLOAN were obtained anticipated. The existence of economies of size from GDA for the same period. For the rein agriculture arising from more efficient use of mainder of the variables secondary data were machinery and equipment (Krause and Kyle; used. As these variables reflected characterisMusser and Marable) would suggest a nontics of the market area of the bank, no linear relationship between SALE and secondary data corresponded to the exact theo-FLOAN. TLOAN would be expected to have a retical specifications. Therefore, we assumed positive coefficient in equation 3 in reflection that the county in which the bank was located of the effect of total portfolio size on amount of represented the market area of the bank farm loans. A negative coefficient on URBAN (Boehlje, Harris, and Hoskins) . The large in equation 3 would reflect greater demand for number of banks in Georgia increased the nonagricultural loans in urban areas. plausibility of this assumption; the few banks Economic theory is not very helpful in with statewide activity were deleted from the specifying equation 4 because of the nonmarket analysis. Two dummy variables were conallocation of GLOAN arising from the limited structed to represent URBAN. URBAN 1 had size of the GDA program. FLOAN is included a value of one for banks located in a county in a to reflect the impact of the volume of agriculStandard Metropolitan Statistical Area with a tural credit on possible awareness of GDA and city of population at least 15,000 and a value of existence of customers with needs for the prozero otherwise. URBAN 2 had a value of one gram; a positive coefficient would conform to for banks in a county in a Standard Metropoli-tan Statistical Area which did not have a city ficients. All coefficients in the final specificaof at least 15,000 or in a county with a city of tion except for DEPURBAN1 are significant at least 15,000 and outside a Standard Metroat least at the 10 percent level and have the politan Statistical Area, and a value of zero expected sign. otherwise (U.S. Department of Commerce
The coefficients in the model are consistent 1974, 1975 folios have reduced variance which encourages substitution of loans for other assets. The particular magnitude of the coefficient sug-DEPURBAN2 in equation 6 and SALE in gests that farm loans are substituted for nonequation 7 were deleted in the final specificaloan assets with nonfarm loans being constant. tion because of statistically insignificant coefAs with the coefficient in GLOAN in equation 28 6, this relationship cannot be supported statisvide tentative support for the proposition that tically-the hypothesis that the coefficient of the current guaranteed federal loan program FLOAN is less than one cannot be rejected.
increases the supply of agricultural credit. As noted heretofore, equation 7 has the least However, differences in operating practices support from economic theory. The coefficients and in eligiblity for loan insurance between have the anticipated signs; however, more the-GDA and the FmHA require estimation of a oretical and empirical research is necessary to similar model for federally insured loans to verify this equation.
verify this implication, particularly because FmHA loans were not implicitly considered in our research. CONCLUSIONS Several weaknesses of our analysis suggest directions for future research in this area. Most Our econometric model of Georgia banks important, more theoretical development of supports the view that insured GDA loans inthe model should be considered; finance literacrease the aggregate supply of credit to the ture on the banking sector may be helpful in agricultural sector from commercial banks, but this regard. Disaggregating the equation for may also result in some redistribution of credit TLOANS into more specific categories and inwithin the agricultural sector. This finding cluding more equations would also be useful in does imply that a national program such as analyzing the tradeoffs among alternative that provided by GDA would be effective in bank assets. Finally, collection of a time series increasing the participation of banks in the of cross-sectional data would allow estimation agricultural credit sector. The results also proof the model in structural form.
